This paper shows that we can normalize job and worker characteristics such that without frictions there exists a linear relationship between wages on the one hand and worker and job type indices on the other hand. However, for 5 European countries and the US we …nd strong evidence for a systematic concave relationship. An assignment model with search frictions provides a parsimonious explanation for our …ndings. This model yields two restrictions on the coe¢ cients which …t the data well. Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error we …nd that reservation wages are 25% lower than they would be in a frictionless world. Our results relate to the literature on industry wage di¤erentials and on structural identi…cation in hedonic models.
Introduction
How much output is lost due to search frictions? To what extent do wages deviate from the simple Walrasian rule of "one good, one price", implying that workers with equal human capital should earn equal wages? Labor economists have been struggling with these questions for ages. Empirical inference is troubled by the fact that residuals in simple Mincer type earnings regressions can be due to at least three factors: (1) imperfect measurement of the relevant human capital variables, (2) measurement error in wages, and (3) non-Walrasian features of the labor market like search frictions, resulting in wage dispersion among otherwise homogeneous workers. A simple way to decompose the error term in these three components is not available. This paper makes the following contributions. We show that if worker skill and job complexity can be described by one dimensional indices then there exists a normalization such that in a frictionless economy wages only depend linearly on these indices. If there are search frictions and wages are determined by Nash bargaining, then wages are concave in those indices. In practice, we typically do not observe all factors that are relevant for worker skill and job complexity and wages are measured with error. We show that our identi…cation strategy still works if the third moments of the distributions of observable and unobservable worker and job characteristics are approximately equal to zero, as holds for the normal distribution. Even if this condition is not satis…ed, only very strange assumptions on these distributions can rationalize our empirical …ndings for the US and …ve European countries. Our results on the concavity of log wages are almost identical across the six countries that we consider but we show that the required unobserved third moments, that could potentially rationalize our …ndings in the absence of search frictions, would have to di¤er widely across these countries. The empirical evidence and the regularity of our results across countries provides strong support for the relevance of search frictions above unobserved heterogeneity. Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988 ) claimed that the industry e¤ects in simple OLS earnings regressions are the re ‡ection of genuine wage di¤erentials between workers with equal human capital in di¤erent industries. These di¤erentials might be driven by e¢ ciency wages or rent sharing. Others took a more sceptical position, claiming that industry di¤erentials might very well be attributed to unobserved worker characteristics which are correlated with industry choice, see Murphy and Topel (1987) .
The large literature on the measurement error in schooling variables, see Angrist and Krueger (1991) , reveals that the importance of these unobserved characteristics should not be underestimated. Recent contributions apply matched worker-…rm data to resolve the issue, see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1998) . Another strand in this literature starts from Burdett and Mortensen's (1998) model of monopsonistic wage setting in a world with on the job search. A high wage raises the in ‡ow and reduces the out ‡ow of workers, but it also reduces pro…ts by increasing the wage bill. This trade-o¤ results in a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution for workers with equal human capital.
Larger …rms pay higher wages and have longer average tenures. These correlations allow for inference on the dispersion of wages, holding constant the human capital of the worker, see Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Postel Vinay and Robin (2002) .
We apply the search model of Teulings and Gautier (2004) , that is based on the assignment models analyzed by Sattinger (1975) and Teulings (1995) . Workers vary by their level of skill (or human capital) and jobs by their level of complexity. Both the skill and the complexity index vary continuously, so that there is an in…nitum of job and worker types. High skilled workers are assumed to have an absolute advantage in all jobs and a comparative advantage in complex jobs. In the Walrasian version of this model, each worker type is assigned to a unique job type where output reaches its maximum.
Both this optimal complexity level and log wages are increasing in the skill type of the worker, the former due to comparative advantage, the latter due to absolute advantage.
In the presence of search frictions, workers will not wait for ever till this unique …rst best job type comes along. When a contact occurs between a worker and a job, both face a trade o¤ between either the pay o¤ of matching with the partner that is available now or waiting for a more suitable partner. Hence, workers accept a range of job types instead of a single job type as in the Walrasian equilibrium. If wages are set by Nash bargaining between the worker and the …rm then both sides share the loss in output relative to what it would be in the optimal assignment. Wages for a particular type of worker are concave in the job type: the wage reaches a maximum for the level of job complexity that maximizes output; it is lower for either less or more complex jobs.
Using standard human capital variables, we construct a worker skill index that we transform such that it is linearly related to wages. Similarly, we construct a complexity index linearly related to wages, using industry and occupation dummies. When both indices enter jointly in a wage regression, their coe¢ cients have no structural interpretation, since both indices are perfectly collinear in the Walrasian case, due to the comparative advantage assumption. Hence, the size of both coe¢ cients is determined by the share of unobserved heterogeneity in the variance of both indices, and not by the underlying structure of the economy. 1 We show, however, that it is di¢ cult to justify the second order terms on these grounds. Our methodology allows a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the size of the cost of search, which is de…ned as the relative gap between the worker's reservation wage and the wage she would receive in a hypothetical Walrasian world. This cost of search is estimated to be between 15 and 30 %. The output losses due to non-Walrasian features of the labor market are therefore substantial.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives a theoretical relation between wages and worker and job characteristics in the presence of search frictions. This relation is used in Section 3 to explain why in a simple Mincerian type of wage equation, second order terms of worker skills and job characteristics are signi…cant. We also discuss whether or not these second order terms can be interpreted in terms of unobserved characteristics.
Section 4 concludes by relating our results to the literature on industry wage di¤erentials and on structural identi…cation of hedonic models. Hence, log wages are equal to the value of output. Finally, the value of leisure is zero, so that workers prefer working for any positive wage over non-employment.
In this Walrasian equilibrium, workers of type b s are assigned to that job type b c(b s)
where they produce the highest value of output, and by implication, where they earn the highest wage. By construction, b y [b s; b c (b s)] satis…es the …rst and second order condition for a maximum: As a further consequence, the assignment of workers to jobs is linear with unit slope:
It is important to note that these normalizations can be imposed without loss of generality. Note furthermore that the only assumptions we have made are: the di¤erentiability of the output function y ( ), the existence of single dimensional worker and job type indices, absolute and comparative advantage of higher skilled types at more complex jobs, and the existence of an interior maximum in c.
Adding search frictions
The Walrasian assignment model of the previous section can be extended with search frictions, following the analysis of Teulings and Gautier (2004) . The idea is that now workers meet only a limited number of job types per period and vice versa. For simplicity, we rule out on the job search: workers can only search while being unemployed. In the Walrasian economy, a worker of skill type b s is assigned to the unique job type b c (b s) that maximizes the value of her output, yielding a one-to-one correspondence between b s and b c.
Hence, both variables are perfectly correlated. In the presence of search frictions, this oneto-one correspondence breaks down, so that the correlation between b s and b c is no longer perfect. Workers cannot a¤ord to wait forever until the optimal job type b c (b s) comes along, and mutatis mutandis the same for …rms. Hence, they accept a set of job types instead of just the optimal job. Let b r (b s) be the log reservation wage of the worker. Workers accept only jobs that pay a log wage of at least b r (b s). In the Walrasian equilibrium, this reservation wage is equal to the log wage and to log output:
since workers will not accept any wage o¤er that pays less than what they can get in the optimal assignment. In the presence of search frictions, log reservation wages b r (b s) are
The variable b x (b s) has a nice interpretation. Let be the discount rate. Then, the asset 
Hence, we refer to b x (b s) as the cost of search. The cost of search consists of three parts, the cost of maintaining vacancies, the output loss due to unemployment while searching for a job, and the output loss due to a suboptimal assignment. 4 Together, these three components add up exactly to the total cost of search b x (b s), see Teulings and Gautier (2004) .
Search models imply that each match between a worker and a …rm is characterized by a positive surplus b
We assume wages to be set by Nash bargaining over this surplus. Let be the worker's bargaining power parameter. Then, the log wage of an b s-type worker in a b c-type job satis…es approximately: 4 Like in the Walrasian case, there are no other factors of production than labor. Firms have to pay a per period cost of maintaining a vacancy, which limits the supply of vacancies. Firm's expected share of the surplus compensates them for the cost of maintaining vacancies, see Teulings and Gautier (2004) for details.
5 Strictly speaking, this relation applies in levels:
However, for a small relative di¤erence x, the di¤erence is of higher order:
Close to the Walrasian equilibrium, x is small. 6 There is an important di¤erence between this model and Shimer and Smith (2000) . They treat both sides of the market symmetrically, so that their wage equation reads:
where by symmetry = We normalize b s and b c along the lines we discussed in the previous section: The search equilibrium is depicted in Figure E . Panel A represents the Walrasian case, 7 Teulings and Gautier (2004) show that previous assumptions imply the matching set of type b s to be uniquely de…ned by a lower and upper bound, denoted b c (b s) and b c + (b s), which are increasing in b s. By Leibniz 'rule:
where g ( ) ; G ( ) denote the density and distribution function of type b c. The …rst term is the wage change for intramarginal types c, which is always positive since b
The second term measures the e¤ect of changes in the composition of the matching set: jobs drop out at the lower bound, while new ones enter at the top. Both the new jobs and those which are dropping out pay less than the average one, since:
Hence, this second term is negative if:
For the derivative with respect to b c, this problem does not occur: 
Hence, the second term is always positive. The Bellman equation for the asset value of a vacancy of type b c is of the form:
where is a function of the parameters of the model, see Teulings and Gautier (2004) . This equation holds identically for all b c. Hence, its …rst di¤erence must also hold, implying:
where r (s) = w (s) = y (s), and hence x (s) = 0. All workers of type s are assigned to the job type c (s) that maximizes their output. Panel B represents the case with search frictions: r (s) is less than y (s), the di¤erence being x (s). An s-type job seeker is less choosy than in a Walrasian world and accepts all c-type tasks for which y (s; c) r (s).
Log wages w (s; c) are a weighted average of r (s) and y (s; c). Figure 1 depicts both situations in s; c-space: the Walrasian equilibrium is represented by the solid diagonal, the search equilibrium by the band around it.
Next, we simplify the analysis by the following assumption.
Assumption 1: The cost of search is equal for all skill types:
By this assumption the cost of search is equal for all skill types, so that x is the fraction of foregone output due to search frictions, i.e. the di¤erence between output in a Walrasian economy and an economy with search frictions. In a more general model, Assumption 1 is likely to be violated. Here our aim is more modest. We are only interested in a …rst order approximation of x (s). For that purpose, we ignore variations in x (s) along the support of s. Teulings and Gautier (2004) derive an expression for x (s) in terms of the primitives of the model. A suitable combination of the density of skill supply and the cost of maintaining vacancies, generates Assumption 1 as a result. Furthermore, we show that x (s) is almost constant in simulations of the model for quite standard assumptions on these primitives, except for extreme values of s.
We apply a Taylor expansion around the Walrasian equilibrium, where the cost of search is zero, x = 0. Let c c c (s) denote the deviation from the optimal allocation for type s and let c c + (s) c (s), where c + (s) is the most complex job that a worker of type s is willing to accept, that is, for which y (s; c) r (s). In the Walrasian equilibrium, c = 0. A worker of type s turns down more complex jobs because the wage would be below her reservation wage. Nash bargaining implies that output is equal to the reservation wage at the boundary of the matching set. Hence:
By a second order Taylor expansion of equation (1) with respect to c around c = c(s) and using y c [s; c (s)] = 0, we have:
We can make exactly the same argument for the least complex job that a worker of type s is willing to accept. Hence, job o¤ers with j cj > c are rejected.
Lemma 1:
Up to a second order Taylor expansion, the matching set of a type s worker is symmetric around the midpoint c (s), its upper bound being c (s) + c and its lower bound
This lemma follows from the fact that a second order approximation of y(s; c) around its maximum is a parabola which is always symmetric around its maximum. Lemma 1 can be used for the derivation of the expectation of c 2 in the matching set, again using a Taylor expansion:
The parameter jy cc j has a special interpretation. It is the curvature of the log cost function of a …rm producing task type c, or, the complexity dispersion parameter, see Teulings (2005) , measuring the productivity loss due to suboptimal assignments:
where the second equality follows from the same Taylor expansion as in equation (3).
Since the wage of the least attractive job type in the matching set of a worker of type s is equal to her reservation wage, Loss( c ) is equal to x. Consider a second order Taylor expansion of equation (2) 
of s conditional on c and vice versa:
The inequality in the second line follows from the concavity of y(s; c) in c. Note that the second order expansion implies the implicit assumption that the complexity dispersion parameter is constant along the domain of s. Variation in y cc along the domain of s is a higher order phenomenon that will be ignored in the subsequent analysis. Likewise we can ignore variation in the cost of search x. The subsequent proposition relates the other partial derivatives of w (s; c) to the parameters of the joint distribution of s and c. 
The variance of w satis…es, see Appendix A:
where the second step uses (7). The inequality applies if 1=2 and 1=2 which is reasonable from an empirical point of view, see e.g. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) . The latter approximation shows that the variance of the second order term is small relative to the …rst order term for values of x up to 0:50. We need only two additional assumptions on functional forms to derive these relations:
both the cost of search x and the complexity dispersion parameter y cc must be constant along the support of s. Since we focus on a second order approximation of the e¤ect of search frictions, those assumptions are not restrictive because a violation of them has only higher order e¤ects on y(s; c).
3 Empirical analysis
The measurement of the key variables
A fundamental problem in the empirical analysis of non-Walrasian features of wages and worker-to-job assignments is the di¢ culty to distinguish between deviations from the frictionless assignment and measurement error in the data. Hence, if we want to apply the framework developed above for an empirical analysis, we have to allow for the fact that the three main ingredients of our analysis are all observed with a fair amount of unobserved heterogeneity or measurement error. Let q be a vector of observed worker characteristics, and m a vector of observed job characteristics. Without loss of generality, we can normalize all observed and unobserved characteristics such that they have a zero mean. Further, denote the observed skill and complexity indices by s and c respectively, the unobserved components by " s and " c and measurement error in wages by " w : Then, we can model measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity as follows: 
Both the skill index s and the complexity index c are decomposed into two orthogonal parts. The measurement error in wages is uncorrelated with any other random variable in the model. Bound and Krueger (1991) report that the ratio of variance of the signal to the total variance in log hourly wages is 0.84 for the CPS.
Given those de…nitions, it is not very restrictive to write,
since we can include everything and its square in q and m: Therefore, any di¤erentiable non-linear relation can be captured up to an arbitrary small degree of misspeci…cation.
Similarly, the additive separability between the observed and the unobserved component is not a restriction: it just implies that we de…ne c E Hence, in that case and can be consistently estimated from the following regression models:
where " s and " c are error terms. The error terms in both regressions re ‡ect the unobserved part of worker and job characteristics and the measurement error in log wages, that is:
" s = " s + " w and " c = " c + " w . Note that we run separate regressions for the supply and the demand side of the market. If we had included q and m simultaneously, it would be unclear whether our estimates re ‡ect a supply or a demand side relationship; q would have served partly as a proxy for the unobserved part in the complexity index, " c , and m would have served partly as a proxy for the unobserved part in the skill index, " s .
Since s and c are perfectly correlated, it is quite likely that s is correlated with " c and that c is correlated with " s . Only by estimating both relations separately, we can give a structural interpretation to the regression coe¢ cients. In fact, this procedure is similar to the approach proposed by Rosen (1974) . We return to this issue below.
The simple procedure laid out in equation (10) works …ne in a Walrasian world. However, if the real world is characterized by search frictions and if log wages therefore satisfy the concave function (6), then at …rst sight, this procedure does not seem to work anymore. Equation (6) includes quadratic terms in s and c, so that estimates of and that do not allow for this non-linearity seem to be biased. The subsequent proposition shows this intuition to be false:
Proposition 2 If (6) holds and measurement error in s, c and w is as in (9), then and are consistently estimated by equation (10).
Proof. Equation (6) The intuition for Proposition 2 is that the correlation between w and s introduced in equation (6) by the term ! s 2 is exactly o¤set by the correlations introduced by both other second order terms, ! (1 + ) sc and !c 2 , since s and c are positively correlated.
Taking these three terms together, w and s 2 are uncorrelated. Mutatis mutandis the same analysis applies to the correlation between w and c 2 . Apart from the unobserved heterogeneity in s and c respectively and the measurement error in log wages, the error terms " s and " c also capture the e¤ect of suboptimal assignment due to search frictions.
Proposition 2 is just a re ‡ection of the way we have constructed our search model. We Proposition 2 implies that w and s 2 should be uncorrelated. This implication is imposed in our estimation procedure. We apply an iterative procedure such that if we enter both s and s 2 in regression (10), then the coe¢ cient on the second order term s 2 is indeed exactly zero. First, we run the regression:
constructed from equation (9) and " s 1 = s s 1 . Second, we construct a new variable
and rerun the …rst regression where we replace s 1 by s 2 . We repeat these steps till 2 = 0. Mutatis mutandis the same applies to our regression for c. 9 This algorithm therefore normalizes s such that any correlation between s and " s is eliminated.
Our empirical analysis for the United States applies the CPS March supplements for 1989-92. We consider full time, non-farmer, private sector workers aged between 16 and 65, which yields 222179 observations. We constructed hourly wages. The vector q includes the usual variables: total years of schooling, a third order polynomial in experience, highest completed education, being married, having a full or part time contract including various 9 9 iterations were su¢ cient for both s and c. 
Can we give a structural interpretation to these coe¢ cients? In Appendix B, we prove the following result:
Proposition 3 Consider the Walrasian assignment model w (s) = s and w [s(c)] = c, the measurement model in equation (9), and the regression equation (11). The coe¢ cients s and c satisfy: The proof follows directly from the formulas for OLS regression coe¢ cients. We cannot identify R 2 s ; R 2 c and C from the data directly, even in this Walrasian world, since we have no way to decompose the error terms " s and " c in equation (11) into " w on the one hand and " s and " c on the other hand. R For example, referring to the old debate started by Doeringer and Piore's (1971) analysis of segmented labor markets where wages are an attribute of jobs rather than of workers:
a high value of a c is then interpreted as support for the segmented labor market view of the world, while a high value of s is interpreted as support for the traditional human capital interpretation. Similarly, Krueger and Summers (1988) use this type of regression to estimate inter-industry wage di¤erentials. Those are then interpreted as evidence for non-Walrasian wage setting. The above analysis makes the simple and well known point that the regression coe¢ cients can be just a re ‡ection of the relative amount of unobserved heterogeneity in s and c, and that any structural interpretation is therefore hazardous.
Can we use this framework to distinguish between the Walrasian model and the model extended with search frictions? The critical di¤erence between both models is that in the latter log wages are positively related to the cross term sc, see equation (6) 
The second order terms show up highly signi…cantly. 10 The issue is whether this result is su¢ cient to reject the simple Walrasian model, w = s + " w = c + " w , or that it can be interpreted in the same way as equation (11) Proposition 4 Posit the Walrasian model w(s; c) = s = c and the measurement model (9). Then, any value of sc can be rationalized from the correlation of s c to " s and/or " c .
Proof.z can be linearly decomposed into four orthogonal components,ṽ, such that orthogonal to s and c: E [v i v 4 ] = 0, i = 1; 3: However, the orthogonality of the components ofṽ does not impose any restrictions on the value of third moments, E [v i v j v 4 ] ; i = 1; 2; 3, j = 1; 2; 3: Therefore, any value of sc can be rationalized this way.
Proposition 5 requires an assumption on the joint distribution of s; " s ; c; and " c .
Assumption 2:ṽ follows a multivariate distribution with third moments equal to zero.
Proposition 5 Equation (9) and Assumption 2 imply that if the Walrasian model is the true model, then ss = sc = cc = 0 in (12).
Proof. Consider the expression for the coe¢ cients of an OLS regression,~
where X is the matrix of explanatory variables and whereỹ fwg is the vector of observed log wages. The coe¢ cients of second order terms are di¤erent from zero only if either the …rst and the second order terms are correlated (the cross product of the …rst and second order terms in X 0 X 6 = 0) or the second order terms are correlated with w (X 0ỹ 6 = 0). Regarding X 0 X: both s and c are linear combinations ofz. Sincez can be linearly decomposed in four orthogonal components,ṽ, the …rst and the second order terms are only correlated if the third moments of these components are di¤erent from zero, or if the cross terms E v i v 2 j 6 = 0. However, these moments are zero, due to Assumption 2.
Regarding X 0 y: since u is uncorrelated with anything else, a potential correlation must be due to the vector of true log wages, w. Under the Walrasian model, it satis…es: w = s = c.
Hence, w is a linear combination ofz. Then, a similar argument as for X 0 X establishes that w is uncorrelated with the second order terms, since otherwise either a third moment or a cross term ofṽ should be non-zero. Both are ruled out by Assumption 2.
Corollary 2:
Under Assumption 2, the inclusion of second order terms does not a¤ect the estimated value of s and c , since the second and …rst order terms are uncorrelated, so that the
Proposition 4 states the negative claim that we cannot learn about the relevance of the search model from the regression equation (12) Empirically, we do …nd that the coe¢ cients s and c do not change much by the inclusion of the second order terms, see equation (11) and (12). The covariance matrix of
, is shown in Table 1 . For the third moments, the t-statistics for the signi…cance of the deviation from zero are listed underneath the covariances. 11 We do not present the fourth moment because they have no e¤ect on our estimates of the higher order terms ( ss , cc and sc ). Although the covariances of the …rst and the second order terms are small, they are all signi…cant. This is not surprising. Given the large number of observations (0.2 million), any small deviation of symmetry will be detected with high signi…cance. We conclude that the third moments of s and c are not exactly zero but that they come close. tions with unobserved worker and job characteristics unlikely. Although we have not yet derived the precise relation between the search model in equation (6) and the regression model (12) (we do this in the next section), it seems natural to assume that the signs of w ss ; w sc ; and w cc carry over to ss ; sc ; and cc . These sign restrictions hold in equation (12). Similarly, equation (6) implies w sc = jw ss + w cc j. One would expect that this restriction carries over to equation (12): sc = j ss + cc j. By and large, this restriction holds. In Section 3.4, we account for the e¤ect of the unobserved components in s and c on this restriction. That derivation brings our test even closer to the actual results.
As a …nal piece of evidence, consider Proposition 4 again. It states that one can always construct some distribution ofz such that the second order terms can be rationalized as capturing unobserved heterogeneity. The question is: what should this joint distribution look like? In principle, the set of joint distributions that can generate the second order terms by unobserved heterogeneity is in…nitely large. Hence, we have to impose some structure to obtain a manageable characterization. We impose the assumption that the components ofṽ are not only orthogonal, but also independent.
Consider the formula for OLS regression coe¢ cients, = (X 0 X) 1 X 0 w. We have seen that the third moments of the observable job and worker characteristics are about zero,
, that is, X 0 X is close to block diagonal in the …rst and second order terms. This …ts our conclusion that the coe¢ cients for the …rst order terms are hardly a¤ected by the inclusion of the second order terms. Hence, the coe¢ cients of the second order terms must be due to X 0 w 6 = 0. What value of the third moments of ṽ create the value of X 0 w reported in ]. So, given the assumption of the independence of the components ofṽ, the only way we can rationalize our results from unobserved heterogeneity is to assume that v 3 is skewed to right while v 1 and v 2 are skewed to the left. The degree of skewness required to yield the moments listed in Table 1 is modest, that is, much less than the skewness generated by the exponential distribution. So from that perspective, explaining the second order terms from unobserved heterogeneity is not inconceivable. 12 However, consider the results of similar regressions for the …ve other OECD countries reported in Table 2 . 13 All countries satisfy the three sign restrictions on the coe¢ cients for the second order terms that are implied by the hypothesis that wages are concave in worker and job characteristics. Except for Germany, they all satisfy the constraint that sc = j ss + cc j. This strongly suggests that we have come across an 12 A measure of skewness is E v 3 =E v 2 3=2 , which is equal to 2 for the exponentional distribution. In this case, we have:
= 0:055 13 The data come from the Luxembourg Income Study (http://www.lisproject.org) which is based on the Family Budget Survey (INSEE) for France, the SOEP (DIW) for Germany, the SEP (CBS) for the Netherlands and the Family Expenditure Survey (UKDA) for the UK. For Portugal we use the Quadros de Pessoal for Portugal (Ministry of Labour and Solidarity). The samples include full time, non-farmer, private sector workers aged between 16 and 65. We calculated s and c for each country the same way as we discussed before where s captures all the observable worker characteristics (including higher order terms) that were available and c captures all the job characteristics. In particular, the information we had on c varied considerably , i.e. industry and occupation coding varied between 2 and 4 digits. empirical regularity. If this regularity was due to systematic non-zero third moments in the joint distribution ofṽ, then we would expect that this regularity would also show up in the covariance of …rst and second order e¤ects as reported in Table 1 for the US. In Appendix C, we present the covariance matrices for the other countries. They show no regularity. We view it as unlikely that the pattern of non-symmetric distributions, which di¤er widely across OECD economies, as reported in Appendix C, goes hand in hand with coe¢ cients for the second order terms which are about the same. The search model provides a much more parsimonious explanation for our …ndings. 
A structural interpretation in the context of the search model
If s and c would be fully observed, the empirical implementation of equation (7) would be simple. We would calculate the correlation between s and c, p , from the data, estimate equation (6) to obtain an estimate for ! and calculate x from equation (7), using a value for derived from the empirical literature, for example Abowd and Lemieux (1993) .
Given that we do not have such perfect measures, the imperfect correlation between the observed indices s and c can be due to either unobserved characteristics or search frictions which cause s and c themselves to be imperfectly correlated. It is useful in the context of the search model to de…ne C as the ratio of the correlation between the observed skill and complexity indices on the one hand, and the correlation between their true values on the other hand. Hence:
with 0 < C < 1: unobserved heterogeneity in s and c reduces their correlation. Finally, we now make the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 3:z follows a multivariate normal distribution.
Then, Proposition 6 provides a structural interpretation for the coe¢ cients of equation (12):
Proposition 6 Consider the search model (6), and the measurement model (9) and assumption 3. Then, the regression coe¢ cients in (12) converge to:
while the coe¢ cients for the second order terms converge to: 2 Equation (15) reveals that the search model imposes two non-linear restrictions on the extended Mincer equation (12), relating the coe¢ cients sc = ss and sc = cc to s and c . As can be easily veri…ed from the …rst line of equation (15), if s and c are perfectly
The second line of equation (15) were no search frictions ( = 1 ), then the coe¢ cients of the second order terms would be zero. This possibility is clearly rejected by the data. Second, sc is positive and the signs of ss and cc must be negative since (14) implies that s and c are between 0 and 1. These restrictions are clearly satis…ed, see the estimation results for equation (12) in Section 2. A stricter tests applies the two non-linear restrictions. We estimate (10), (12) and (15) simultaneously by non-linear least squares. Because we have more than 200,000
observations, this restriction is just rejected by an F-test but the R 2 of this model and (12) is equal up to four decimals. All in all, we interpret the above as strong evidence in favor of the interpretation of the second order terms as being due to search frictions.
Regrettably, we are unable to identify ! and separately, since they enter in the same way in all three equations (15). We can therefore estimate ! (1 ) 2 , but not its two components. The intuition is that a high value of sc can be due to two factors. Either, the correlation between s and c is low due to large search frictions and no measurement error, leading to a high Var[cjs] and hence a low correlation between s and c. But then cc is a fairly accurate estimate of !. Or, the low correlation between s and c is mainly low due to large measurement error in s and c, so that Var[cjs] is low and is high.
But then cc underestimates ! due to attenuation bias, so that the cost of a suboptimal assignment is high due to a strong curvature of y (s; c). Since we cannot establish directly from the data, we have no way to distinguish between both stories. Alternatively, we can phrase this problem in terms of equation (3). Either, there is a lot of unobserved heterogeneity in s and c, so that we underestimate jy cc j by attenuation bias, but then we overstate c 2 because most of the imperfect correlation between s and c is due to unobserved heterogeneity, not to search frictions. Or, we observe s and c well. In that case, our estimate of jy cc j is reasonably accurate, but then all the imperfect correlation is due to search frictions.
The non-linear least squares estimation of (15) for the US yields (t-value between brackets):
The observed correlation between s and c provides a lower bound for , where all imperfect correlation between s and c is attributed to search frictions and none to unobserved heterogeneity: > Cor[ s; c] 2 . Hence, equations (7), (8), (13), (14), (15) The values for other OECD countries are given by Table 3 However, direct estimates of ! suggest much higher values than 0:30. Teulings (2005) derives a relation between the complexity dispersion parameter and Katz and Murphy's (1992) estimate of the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled workers. This relation implies that the complexity dispersion parameter is in the order of 2, 14 so ! = 0:5 which suggests a higher value for . 15 Using this value for ! and applying equation (13) and (17) and there is no on-the-job-search, then the cost of search is distributed evenly among its three components: the rate of unemployment, the rate of vacancies, and the cost of suboptimal assignment, see Teulings and Gautier (2004) . Hence, the cost of search is three times the natural unemployment rate, that is, x = 3 5% = 15%, about half as high as the estimate based on wage data.
Can we reconcile these two independent and con ‡icting pieces of evidence? In Gautier, longer means that the entire option value of continued search has to be given up. This makes unemployed workers less choosy. Then, a larger fraction of the cost of search is due to mismatch and the cost of search becomes more than three times the unemployment rate.
Final remarks
We conclude this paper by relating our results to the two strands in the literature that have been discussed in Section 1. First, our results have implications for the discussion on interindustry wage di¤erentials initiated by Krueger and Summers'(1988) classic paper. The framework laid out in Section 2 basically points at a fundamental problem of interpreting the results of wage regressions including both worker and job characteristics in the set of regressors: the one will be a proxy for the unobserved component of the other and vice versa. This insight is all but new. Since Krueger and Summers (1988) , many papers have addressed this issue by using panel data, initially to control for unobserved worker characteristics, and more recently to control for unobserved worker and job characteristics simultaneously, by using matched …rm-worker data, see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1998). The debate has not yet been settled.
The contribution of this paper is to show that the set up in Krueger and Summers might be mistaken. Their regressions suggest that some industries are universally "better" than others, as they pay higher wages. This feature is due to the additivity of their log wage function in worker and job characteristics. Hence, their wage function is not log supermodular, as is required for comparative advantage. In a world with comparative advantage / log supermodularity there is no such thing as a universally "better"job. The wage for a worker of a particular type is concave in the characteristics of the job she holds, and there is an interior maximum. A "higher" job type than this "optimal" job type yields a lower wage. Furthermore, the "optimal" job type depends on a worker's characteristics. In our regressions, we allow for this concavity by entering second order terms in worker and job characteristics. These turn out to be highly signi…cant, which puts into question the interpretation of Krueger and Summers' industry dummies as capturing e¢ ciency wage e¤ects or rents. In models without frictions, the fact that we observe positive assortative matching is typically explained by comparative advantage of high skilled workers in complex jobs and this view seems to be uncontroversial. There is no reason to abandon this assumption when frictions are introduced. Similarly, our results have implications for the methodology of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1998).
Interestingly, while unobserved characteristics deem hopeless any attempt to provide a structural interpretation of the relative magnitude of the coe¢ cients for worker and job characteristics in a cross section analysis, we have shown that the second order terms are much less sensitive to this problem. One must make quite extreme assumptions on the distribution of the error terms to rationalize these coe¢ cients by unobserved heterogeneity.
We provide some simple formulas to correct the coe¢ cients of the second order terms for the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity assuming their distribution to be normal.
Second, a comparison of our approach to the literature on the estimation of assignment models o¤ers an alternative interpretation for what is at stake. Rosen's (1974) seminal paper on hedonic pricing and assignment sparked a debate on what variation is required for identi…cation of the underlying production and utility functions in this type of model.
In terms of this paper, how can we identify the curvature of y (s; c)? As pointed out by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) , following early contributions by Roy (1951) , identi…cation is problematic because people self-select into the job type c that yields the highest output in a Walrasian equilibrium. In their models with only two job types, there is su¢ cient within job variation in s left to identify a large part of y (s; c), after correcting for the selectivity of worker types by using standard techniques. In our model, which is essentially a continuous version of the Roy model, this strategy no longer works. The equilibrium assignment is characterized by a one-to-one correspondence of s to c, denoted s (c). This one-to-one correspondence yields a perfect correlation between s and c, which renders any attempt to estimate the full functional form of y (s; c) hopeless by a standard multicollinearity problem. One can establish y [s; c (s)] = y (s) (from the zero pro…t condition w (s) = y (s)) and one can establish its …rst derivative y s [s; c (s)] (from the …rst order condition for optimal assignment, w 0 (s) = y s [s; c (s)]), but not its curvature y ss [s; c (s)].
In a Walrasian equilibrium, we observe y (s; c) only for its optimal assignment c = c (s),
and not for other values of c. Kahn and Lang (1988) suggested to use variation between markets in the distribution of the supply of s or the demand for c. This leads to di¤erent equilibrium assignments c (s) in various markets, which allows for the identi…cation of y ss (s; c). Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) exploit the generic non-linearity of the equilibrium assignment c (s).
Here, we travel another route. Workers cannot a¤ord to search for ever for an optimal job when search is costly. They are forced to accept jobs at which they produce less than the maximum output, that is, c 6 = c (s). This process breaks down the perfect correlation between s and c that characterizes the Walrasian equilibrium. Obviously, we have information on log wages w (s; c) and not on log output y (s; c). However, when we assume that gains from a better match quality are shared in some …xed way between the worker and the …rm, the curvature in wages is informative on the curvature in output, see Figure 2 . Adding second order terms in the appropriately transformed indices, s and c allows us to estimate this curvature in wages. Regrettably, the formulas to correct the coe¢ cients for the e¤ect of measurement error do not allow for a complete identi…cation of the underlying structure. They only provide sensible lower bounds for the importance of search frictions. The formulas imply that the output losses due to search frictions are in the order of 25 %, which is substantial. ; the covariance matrix of 'true'second order e¤ects and let X 2 denote the covariance matrix of 'observed'second order e¤ects, both net of their mean. Since all variables are considered in deviation from their mean, we can ignore the intercept. By Assumption 2, X 0 1 X 2 = 0, so that the X 0 X matrix for equation (12) is block diagonal. Hence, we can invert the sub-matrices X 0 1 X 1 and X 0 2 X 2 separately. Hence, the …rst and second order terms can be derived independently.
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